



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Legislative Counsel

Washington, D. C. 20505

Telephone: [REDACTED]


18 February 1982

TO: Ms. Brenda Hudson
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Brenda:

Enclosed are the answers to the
questions for the record from the 1 Feb 82
SASC Worldwide Intelligence briefing.

Sincerely,



Legislative Liaison

Enclosures

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - EA Record

1 - EA Chrono

0EA: [REDACTED]

EA 82-0082/B

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

DOJ - 1125-82

FROM:

6D0120 Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

EA 82-0082/4

25X1

DATE

8 February 1982

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Executive Officer, NIC

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Attachments

7.

6D0120 Hqs

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4-7: The appropriate NIOs have put together the attached responses to Sen. Tower's questions. Please let me know if you need any further NIC assistance on this matter.

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Senata Tower

2/1/82

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

MR. CASEY:

TO WHAT DEGREE HAVE THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF LIKELY SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS IN THE 1990 TIMEFRAME CHANGED OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS?

SPECIFICALLY, HAVE THE NUMBERS OF REENTRY VEHICLES WE PROJECT THEY WILL HAVE DECREASED SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE ESTIMATES MADE IN 1979 AND 1980?

Senata Tower

NUCLEAR PROPULSION SYSTEMS

2/1/82

MR. CASEY:

WHAT IS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE MEANS WHEREBY THE SOVIET UNION IS ACHIEVING THE NUCLEAR PROPULSION CAPABILITIES THAT GIVE THEIR NEW ALPHA SUBMARINE SUCH POTENT CHARACTERISTICS?

IS IT A QUESTION OF SIMPLY REDUCING THE WEIGHT OF THE POWER PLANT SYSTEM (I.E. CUTTING DOWN ON RADIOACTIVE SHEILDING) OR DO YOU BELIEVE A DRAMATIC ADVANCE IN NUCLEAR PROPULSION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIETS?

~~SECRET~~

Questions:

To what degree have the National Intelligence Estimates of likely Soviet strategic force levels in the 1990 timeframe changed over the past few years? Specifically, have the numbers of reentry vehicles we project they will have decreased substantially from the estimates made in 1979 and 1980?

Response:

Annual projections of Soviet strategic missile and bomber warhead levels are not directly comparable because of different criteria and alternative assumptions that are introduced each year into our calculations of likely Soviet strategic force developments. In previous years, a key basis for our projections has been the presence or absence of SALT limitations through the 1980s. This year we are not projecting a SAL-constrained force through the decade. However, the total warheads projected this year for 1990 are consistent with the "NO-SALT" projections in previous NIEs for the same time-frame. This year's projections consist of two alternative forces--either of which is considered realistic and achievable by the Soviets--under the basic assumption that the Soviets begin expanding their force after mid-1982 without SAL constraints. The warhead totals for 1990 for each of these forces are about 14,000 and 18,000. In the 1980 NIE, the NO-SAL force was based on the assumption that SAL-II was abandoned a year earlier than in our current projections, in mid-1981, resulting in some 20,500 warheads in 1990. In our 1979 projections we assumed that the NO-SAL environment commenced in 1980, and that the Soviets could achieve some 21,000 warheads in 1989, the last year of that projection. The greater number of warheads forecast in the 1979 and 1980 projections was, of course, due in part to the earlier termination of SAL constraints.

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QUESTIONS BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND (R-SC) FOR HONORABLE WILLIAM CASEY, DIRECTOR, CIA. FEBRUARY 1, 1982

There has been a great upswing during recent years of terrorist acts committed against Americans. Most recently of course, were the kidnapping of Brigadier General Dozier in Italy and the killing of Lieutenant Colonel Ray in France. It is virtually impossible to prevent random acts of terrorism, but something must be done to curb this threat. Obviously, the best method of stopping terrorists is to eliminate the terrorists, but this is not practicable.

1. What are your ideas on ways of reducing the threat of terrorism to U.S. citizens abroad?
2. Mr. Casey, what is the level of cooperation among our allies in sharing intelligence about terrorist activities?
3. How much more cooperation do you feel would be forthcoming had the Church Committee not subjected the CIA to so much public exposure?

Let me turn to another subject briefly. There has been a large amount of press coverage about reports that Americans are still being held as POW's in Southeast Asia. There have also been reports of various paramilitary operations into Laos in search of Americans and allegations that the U.S. military helped finance such operations.

1. Mr. Casey, are Americans still being held against their will in Southeast Asia?
2. Another point of interest in Southeast Asia is the use of chemical agents by the Vietnamese. What is the status of your findings on the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia?

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11 February 1982

MEMORANDUM TO:

FROM :

RE :

Sen. Thurmond's Terrorism Questions

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1. Question: What are your ideas on ways of reducing the threat of terrorism to U.S. citizens abroad?

✓ Answer: The major measures required to reduce the threat of terrorism to U.S. citizens abroad are substantive improvements in our intelligence collection activities and in our basic security mechanisms. The most effective single measure any government can undertake to combat terrorism is an aggressive program to collect timely, well-sourced intelligence on the plans, intentions, and capabilities of terrorist organizations. We have taken steps to improve our own intelligence coverage in this respect. The other measures are in the target-hardening area, such as improvements in airport security of our official installations abroad and the establishment of a competent hostage-rescue capability. In these areas as well, the U.S. Government has made significant progress.

2. Question: Mr. Casey, what is the level of cooperation among our allies in sharing intelligence about terrorist activities?

✓ Answer: The level of cooperation among our allies in sharing information on terrorist activities is surprisingly good, particularly that information which indicates a threat against Americans. We are quite certain that all of our allies are sincere about reporting to us promptly any threats to American interests, i.e. persons and installations. Conversely, we make a dedicated effort to share with our allies any information which we receive about terrorist threats to their interests.

3. Question: How much more cooperation do you feel would be forthcoming had the Church Committee not subjected the CIA to so much public exposure?

✓ Answer: Although public exposure of the CIA by the Church Committee has reduced the willingness of foreign intelligence services to cooperate with us in a number of respects, it has not affected their willingness to share with us information about terrorist threats to Americans. On that subject, all of

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our allies remain sensitive to the fact that an attack by a terrorist organization today against an American target may be followed by an attack against one of those allies themselves. Therefore, while cooperation across-the-board is still not as intimate as we would prefer, the sharing of information on terrorist threats remains excellent.

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Question

Sen. Thurmond: Mr. Casey, are Americans still being held against their will in Southeast Asia?

Answer

Many of the Americans who were reported missing in Southeast Asia were young, so there is at least the possibility that some might still be alive. This lays a strong obligation on all of us to look into this whenever even questionable information reaches us that there is something out there worth checking. If there is even the hint that an American is being held in Southeast Asia, we make every attempt to determine if this is the case. Without being morbid, I must observe that none of these rumors of Americans still being held has ever been verified. We continue to give such verification efforts high priority, though I admit our expectations for positive results are not great.

9 February 1982

Vietnamese Use of Chemical Agents in Southeast Asia

As a result of an intensive review of all available evidence on chemical warfare activities in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, the US Intelligence Community concludes that:

With respect to Laos, Lao and Vietnamese forces, assisted by Soviet logistics and supervision, have used lethal chemical agents against H'Mong resistance forces and villages, causing thousands of deaths since at least 1976. Trichothecene toxins have been positively identified as one of the classes of agents used, but medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve agents also have been employed.

With respect to Kampuchea, Vietnamese forces have used lethal trichothecene toxins on Democratic Kampuchean troops and Khmer villages since at least 1978. Again, medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve agents also have been used.

With respect to the Soviet role, the one hypothesis that best fits all the evidence is that the trichothecene toxins were developed in the Soviet Union, provided to the Lao and Vietnamese either directly or through transfer of technical know-how, and weaponized with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea. There is no intelligence at hand to support alternative explanations, such as completely independent manufacture and use by the Vietnamese. It is highly probable that the USSR also provided other chemical warfare agents. While the evidence on the Soviet role does not constitute proof in the scientific sense, the Intelligence Community finds the case to be thoroughly convincing.